ABSTRACT ▪ This article draws on the findings of research in metalworking and financial services in Belgium, Germany, Italy and the UK to explore the impact of three challenges to established sector-level bargaining arrangements: further decentralization to company level and a reorientation of the bargaining agenda towards competitiveness and employment; the crossborder dimension to bargaining prompted by the single European market; and the emergence of new business activities. It finds similarity within each sector across countries, and similarity within each country across sectors. Implications are drawn out for the balance between company and sectoral bargaining; the relationship between sector-level bargaining arrangements in different countries; and the capacity of sectoral systems to adapt to new contingencies.
Introduction
The inclusive structure of sectoral multi-employer collective bargaining, a cornerstone of most western European industrial relations systems, faces several challenges. Growing international competition has caused a widespread trend towards more decentralized bargaining arrangements, giving management greater scope to negotiate employment practices appropriate to company circumstances. The single European market and its subsequent deepening through economic and monetary union (EMU) have intensified international competition within western Europe, unleashing extensive restructuring and rationalization. The pressure for decentralization to company level has been reinforced, while the bargaining agenda has become increasingly oriented towards competitiveness and employment. The integrated European market has brought national multi-employer bargaining arrangements more sharply into competition with each other, prompting trade union initiatives to coordinate the agenda and outcomes across countries. A further challenge comes from the emergence of new business activities, which by definition have no established collective bargaining arrangements.
This article maps how collective bargaining arrangements are responding to these challenges. It draws on a study of employers' organizations and trade unions in two sectors (metalworking and finance) at EU level and in four countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy and the UK). It finds evidence of continuing differences between countries that are common across the two sectors within countries, but also some striking parallels within each sector across national boundaries that simultaneously constitute differences within countries. In considering the implications, we speculate about the future of sectoral bargaining, the prospects for crossborder coordination, and the possibility of a significant disorganized sector.
The Rationale of Sectoral Collective Bargaining Under Challenge
The rationale for an inclusive structure of multi-employer bargaining at sector level is well established (Sisson, 1987; Traxler et al., 2001) . For trade unions, there are three distinct benefits. Multi-employer bargaining establishes the common rule through standard terms and conditions; provides comprehensive regulation of the labour market, covering many smaller firms where unions are not well organized; and reduces transactions costs, a significant consideration in less concentrated industries. This consideration also applies to employers, for whom three further benefits are identifiable: multi-employer bargaining provides a degree of market control by taking wages and key conditions out of competition; it maximizes employers' bargaining power in dealing with trade unions and can protect them against 'whipsawing' tactics; and it can neutralize the activities of the union in the workplace by restricting the scope for company negotiations. For the state, multi-employer bargaining has facilitated a wide-ranging institutionalization of conflict and therefore contributed to social peace. Depending on the legal framework, multiemployer agreements can be legally enforceable contracts, but also compulsory codes whose provisions can be extended throughout entire industries.
Also well established is that the dominant trend across western Europe over the past 20 years has been towards greater decentralization of collective bargaining and that the pressure has primarily come from employers, in particular large companies. Four main sets of factors have been identified as underpinning this shift in employer position (Katz, 1993; Marginson and Sisson, 1996) :
• Employers' need of greater flexibility to negotiate arrangements suited to the particular requirements of individual companies • Changed management control systems, with devolved budgetary responsibility and performance targets, which provide a new and powerful means of managing costs • Conflict between the provisions of different multi-employer agreements for companies which diversify their business interests across sectors, and • Internationalization of product markets, which weakens the logic of taking labour costs out of competition within the nation-state -a factor of particular salience in the context of a single European market.
Consequently, some of the traditional benefits of multi-employer bargaining may appear less persuasive, especially to large employers. In the face of such pressures, inclusive structures of multi-employer bargaining have followed one of two broad trajectories, differentiated by Traxler (1995) as 'organized' and 'disorganized' variants of decentralization. Under the first, decentralization occurs within the framework of sector agreements, whereas under the second, such agreements disintegrate to be displaced by company-level arrangements. The major tendency since the late 1980s across western Europe has been towards 'organized' decentralization, with more and more of the detail of industrial relations practice filled out through negotiations at company level. The use of opening, opt-out and hardship clauses in sector agreements, and a shift from uniform to minimum standards, are the principal means through which greater company-level flexibility has been achieved. In some countries, as in Italy, higher-level coordination has been strengthened with central agreements establishing new procedural rules formalizing the respective competencies of the different levels and simultaneously conferring greater autonomy to the company level. The UK stands out as the significant instance of 'disorganized' decentralization within western Europe, reflecting the form and status of its former multiemployer agreements (which gave priority to procedural over substantive regulation and were not legally enforceable).
Closer European economic integration means that the pressures on multi-employer structures have intensified, prompting a renewed assessment of their continued viability. Three different kinds of challenge are evident. The first concerns the balance between levels within existing multi-employer structures, with pressures for further decentralization arising from the need to reorient the bargaining agenda towards questions of competitiveness and employment. Léonard (2001: 30) contends that 'bargaining on employment reflects the development of a "different paradigm" of industrial relations, characterized by greater decentralization, higher interdependency of social actors in the regulation of production processes, leading to agreements specifying contractual arrangements at the local level'. How far can decentralization go within the framework of sector agreements without eventually undermining their capacity to enforce a common rule?
The second relates to the interface between sector-level bargaining arrangements in different countries and the potential for regime competition between national bargaining systems within an integrated European economy. Resultant fears of a downward spiral of terms and conditions are prompting counter-initiatives by trade unions to develop bargaining cooperation and coordination across European borders (Gollbach and Schulten, 2000; Le Queux and Fajertag, 2001) . Can effective cross-border coordination of national sectoral structures be realized?
The third challenge concerns the emergence of new business activities, which by definition have no established collective bargaining arrangements. Also, reconfiguration of established industries arising from technological changes to production processes and modes of product delivery and from increased outsourcing is blurring boundaries between sectors. Will a significant disorganized sector emerge? At stake is the adaptability of national systems of sectoral collective bargaining.
A final issue concerns the distinctiveness and similarity of developments across different countries and sectors in the face of these challenges. Pressures from EMU are expected to prompt both convergent and divergent developments (Marginson and Sisson, 1998) . Further decentralization is leading to greater differences within and between sectors within national boundaries, while pan-European production and market servicing is leading to increasing commonalities within individual sectors and (multinational) companies across frontiers.
Research Design
Our approach reflects the emergent strand of comparative industrial relations analysis that underlines the interdependence between simultaneous processes of increased sector-and company-level differentiation within national industrial relations systems and increased convergence at these levels across borders (Ferner and Hyman, 1998; Katz and Darbishire, 2000; Locke, 1995; Marginson and Sisson, 1998) . The research was therefore designed to be both cross-national and cross-sectoral. This enables an assessment of whether responses to the challenges identified above are primarily country specific (evident across different sectors) or sector specific (cutting across countries) or a mixture of both.
The research comprised a comprehensive programme of interviews, undertaken over a six-month period in late 2000 and early 2001, with senior officials of all major employers' organizations and trade unions in European Journal of Industrial Relations 9(2) the two sectors (metalworking and finance) at EU level and in four countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy and the UK), together with analysis of internal documentation and published reports. Where there are different bargaining arrangements for blue-and white-collar workers, the research focused on those for the largest workforce group. The organizations at which interviews were undertaken are listed in Table 1 . The officials interviewed were typically the head of industrial relations, collective bargaining or European departments of employers' and trade union organizations. Interviews followed a standardized, semi-structured schedule covering major, recent procedural and substantive developments in sector agreements; scope for company-level negotiations; future prospects for sectoral agreements; and the cross-border dimension to bargaining, including formal arrangements and the use of comparisons in national negotiations. The research in Belgium, Germany and Italy was undertaken with the involvement of partner institutes. Interviews in the three countries were conducted jointly with a local researcher in each instance, thereby benefiting from the comparative insights which derive from the 'co-interviewing' method (Rainbird, 1996) . The countries were selected to reflect differences in size and integration with other EU economies, as well as in systems of industrial relations. Belgium, Germany and Italy are part of the eurozone, while the UK has remained outside. Economic interdependence between Belgium and Germany far exceeds that between either country and Italy. The collective bargaining systems of Belgium, Germany and Italy represent (differing) instances of 'organized decentralization'. The rationale for including the UK, where sectoral bargaining has all but disappeared, is that movement towards 'disorganized decentralization' is one possible trajectory for the other three countries.
Belgium, Germany and Italy differ in the means by which horizontal coordination across sectors occurs and in the extent to which sector agreements are effective in prescribing the scope for company-level bargaining. In Belgium and Italy, cross-sectoral agreements play an important but differing role, whereas in Germany, there is no such agreement and coordination is secured through pattern bargaining (Traxler et al., 2001) . In what Vilrokx and Van Leemput (1998: 318) describe as 'a highly institutionalized pyramid of negotiation', the inter-sector agreement in Belgium specifies the parameters for subsequent sectoral negotiations and can introduce space for company negotiations. In Italy, the parameters of sectoral and company bargaining are formally governed by the 1993 tripartite agreement, which 'specified in detail for the first time the respective competences of the national-sector and company or local bargaining levels' (Regalia and Regini, 1998: 493) . Bargaining over cost-of-living wage increases takes place sectorally, and over performance at company level. Effectiveness in ensuring that company bargaining is contained within the parameters established in higher-level agreements ('vertical coordination') is considered by Traxler et al. (2001) to be relatively 'high' in Germany and 'low' in Belgium and Italy.
The rationale for our choice of sectors is that they provide contrasts in terms of market structures, production organization and institutions. Metalworking is a key manufacturing sector in each of the four countries, long open to international competition. Large numbers of small firms notwithstanding, it is increasingly dominated by multinational companies, in some instances globally integrated manufacturers. Financial services are significant to the economy of all four countries. Investment banking is already globally organized, while commercial banking operations are increasingly European or wider in scope. Retail banking, however, remains a largely domestic affair with some sharp contrasts in market structure between EU countries. In insurance, cross-border operations are more widespread than in retail banking. Both sectors are undergoing major changes in business activities, technologies and products (Sisson and Marginson, 2000) .
Turning to institutional structures, sectoral agreements remain influential in metalworking in Belgium, Germany and Italy, although companylevel bargaining with either trade unions or works councils is well established within or alongside sector agreements. It is the sole level of bargaining in the UK. In Belgium, metalworking collective bargaining coverage approaches 90 percent and is regarded by both employers' organizations and trade unions as a leading sector in terms of its influence in inter-sector negotiations and as a pace-setter for bargaining innovations in the production sector. There are separate agreements covering blueand white-collar workers. In Germany, metalworking has long been regarded as the pace-setter, collective bargaining coverage in western Germany being around 75 percent. Negotiations are regionally based, but in practice tightly coordinated by the national organizations, Gesamtmetall and IG-Metall. In Italy, metalworking is also regarded as the lead production sector. Coverage approaches 90 percent. In the UK, until 1989 a two-tier national system of pay bargaining prevailed in metalworking, with national minimum rates 'topped up' through local bargaining. In practice, among the major manufacturers actual levels of pay and conditions were increasingly determined in local negotiations. In 1990, the employers' organization withdrew from national negotiations altogether; subsequently, collective bargaining has been on a single-employer basis and coverage is a little in excess of 30 percent.
In financial services, there are separate sector agreements covering banking and insurance in Belgium, Germany and Italy, while in the UK, there are no longer any such agreements. Company-level agreements with trade unions or works councils are more recent in origin than in metalworking, but now constitute the only level of bargaining in the UK and are becoming increasingly widespread in the other three countries. In Belgium, collective bargaining coverage approaches 90 percent in both the banking and insurance sectors. In Germany, there are separate banking agreements for, respectively, private, cooperative, state and savings banks. In practice, the first three agreements are very similar; the employers' associations have an alliance under which they conduct negotiations together. Collective bargaining coverage for banking and insurance in western Germany is about 65 percent. In Italy, collective bargaining in banking has also been fragmented, with separate agreements for national, cooperative and savings banks and for two main occupational groups within these sub-sectors. The four agreements in the national and savings banks were combined into a single agreement in 1999, with the cooperative bank agreements expected to be consolidated into this in the near future. In insurance, there is a long tradition of company bargaining, with the large groups having national company agreements. The coverage of collective agreements is almost 90 percent. In the UK, the national sector agreement covering the major clearing banks in England, which set basic rates of pay and conditions, was terminated in 1987 when the employers' organization withdrew from national bargaining. Subsequently, bargaining over pay and major conditions has been on a single-employer basis. In insurance, single-employer bargaining has long been the established pattern. Some 40 percent of employees in finance are covered by collective agreements.
A Review of the Findings: Varied Responses to Common Challenges
Our findings indicate that the responses of negotiators vary across sectors as well as across countries, and that across countries there are similarities within sectors. In each instance, developments in metalworking are considered first, before turning to those in finance.
Further Decentralization and a Reorientation of the Bargaining Agenda
In metalworking, the scope for company negotiation has widened in recent years in both Belgium and Germany, while in Italy, the balance between the sector and company levels established under the 1993 intersector agreement is being increasingly called into question. In the UK, company-based bargaining has been further decentralized. Increased emphasis in the bargaining agenda on competitiveness and employment is evident across countries.
The earliest opening clauses in the Belgian and German agreements date back to the 1980s and deal with working-time flexibility. In Belgium, the hardship clause under which companies being restructured can move outside of the terms of the agreement is also of long standing. Recent decentralization to the company level in Belgium includes new opening clauses in the sector agreement on supplementary pension schemes, and in the 2000 inter-sector agreement, on financial participation schemes at company level. In Germany, pressure for further decentralization in the 1990s was significantly augmented by the employers' reaction to the harsh economic conditions confronting companies in the eastern Länder, prompting the introduction of a hardship clause in eastern Germany (1993) , and subsequently extended to western Germany (1996) . In western Germany, the 1990s also saw the introduction of opening clauses on working time in the context of safeguarding employment, and on payment structure and performance pay. Italy's 1993 inter-sector agreement signalled the formalization of the increasing negotiating activity at company level, prominent in metalworking, that had been under way since the mid-1980s (Regalia and Regini, 1998) . In the UK, the 1990s have seen a continued trend towards further decentralization as national company arrangements are dissolved into separate bargaining for different businesses.
In practice, there is more negotiating activity at company level than the formal picture suggests. In Belgium, a number of companies have agreements for a working week shorter than the 38 hours specified at sector level. Other matters not covered by the sector agreement are the subject of company negotiations. In practice, too, the sector agreement is flexible in its application; for example, the large automotive companies tend to conclude their own company agreements for pay and working time. The process is 'organized': the automotive companies liaise closely with the employers' association, while the trade unions acknowledge the rationale for such a flexible approach given the tensions which arise from the internal cross-country comparisons between different plants. This flexible approach was summed up by one union official: 'anything is possible, so long as it's negotiated'.
In Germany, reflecting the increased space arising through opening clauses, company negotiations were said no longer to be solely 'administrative' (that is, implementing the terms of agreements), but 'creative' -'there's more space for variation' (union official). The relationship between wage agreements and company-specific extra payments has changed; company negotiations now tend to qualify the actual wage increase concluded at sector level (thereby reducing company-specific wage premiums), rather than supplementing it as happened previously (Hassel and Rehder, 2001) . A growth in autonomous bargaining at company level, outside the frame of the sector agreement, was also tacitly acknowledged. 'Opening clauses can also confirm what has already taken place: it's a dynamic relationship' (union official).
In Italy, there is discrepancy between the formal system, as expressed in the 1993 agreement, and actual practice: the role of company negotiations is greater than prescribed. In metalworking, sector negotiations over the criteria for uprating pay in the light of gaps between anticipated and actual inflation (see below) have been the subject of disagreement between employers and trade unions, and also among unions: in mid-2001, a new sector agreement was opposed by Fiom-CGIL, the largest union (EIRO, 2001) . At company level the criteria for measuring performance, to which pay increases are supposed to be linked, have been the subject of ongoing controversy between employers and unions. Although working-time flexibility, shift patterns and the use of atypical working should be the subject of national negotiation, employers negotiate on these matters at company level in order, it is said, to avoid paying more than once for changes.
The logic of competitiveness has been inserted into the sectoral bargaining agenda in Belgium, Germany and Italy in different ways. In Belgium, the 1996 competitiveness law ties wage increases to movements in labour costs in neighbouring economies (France, Germany and the Netherlands). The inter-sector agreement specifies the wage margin that is open for negotiation at lower levels. In Italy, the 1993 inter-sector agreement stipulates that the cost-of-living increases negotiated at sector level every four years be tied to anticipated inflation, with an interim adjustment in the light of actual inflation negotiated every two years. In Germany, wage increases at sector level are not constrained by law or by a tripartite agreement: the state aims to shape bargaining behaviour through provision of detailed economic data and forecasts to the parties.
In all four countries, there was evidence of a shift to an employmentoriented agenda with a growing focus on qualitative dimensions. Training has been an important theme for recent sectoral negotiations in Belgium, while in Germany, the 2000 agreement guaranteed jobs for young workers completing their training. The subject of a number of recent company agreements in Italy, training has also been a feature of negotiations at inter-sector level. Retirement measures have also been the focus of recent sector agreements, with a sector-wide supplementary pension scheme being established in Belgium and provision for partial pre-retirement introduced in Germany. In the UK, training was reported to be more in evidence on the agenda of company-level negotiations than in the recent past.
In financial services, scope for company negotiation within the framework of sector agreements in banking and insurance has grown over recent years, with growing emphasis on competitiveness and employment, but there is noticeable cross-national variation. Whereas in banking in Germany and Italy such scope is noticeably less than in metalworking, in Belgium it is, if anything, greater. In insurance, the scope for companylevel negotiation is generally less than in metalworking. In both areas, employer and trade union officials reported that company-level negotiations only rarely go beyond the parameters specified by sector agreements, which also contrasts with metalworking. In the UK, company bargaining has been further decentralized in both sub-sectors.
In banking, between 1982 and 1997 there were no changes in the Belgian sectoral agreements on pay and working time. Both remained in force (and pay moved in line with indexation under the inter-sector agreement), but bargaining activity shifted to company level and considerable differences, especially over working time, emerged between banks. Reversing this trend, new three-year sector agreements were concluded in 1998. Because of the diversity of company-specific arrangements to be bridged, these provide for a great deal of flexibility in application. The pay agreement specifies an annual amount, whose distribution is then the subject of company-level negotiations. On working time, the new agreement achieved a decrease from 1780 to 1620 annual hours, but left the method to company negotiations.
Under the private banks' agreement in Germany, the longestestablished opening clause enables company negotiations on workingtime flexibility. In recent years, new opening clauses have been concluded on working-time reductions to safeguard employment and the conversion of supplementary payments into pensions or time off. The total amount of special payments or bonuses is fixed in the sector agreement, but its distribution is the subject of negotiations at company level.
The handling of extensive restructuring and consequent large-scale redundancies has dominated recent negotiations in banking in Italy. The issues have been dealt with at sector level, with the 1999 agreement (for national and savings banks) establishing a framework for implementation at company level. In these circumstances, management has been reluctant to entertain further company-level negotiations, which are largely confined to pay linked to performance. Unlike metalworking, in neither banking nor insurance is overlap between levels seen as problematic for the two-tier system of pay determination.
In insurance, there has been continuity in the sector agreements in Belgium and there is less scope for company-level negotiation than in banking. The main issue open for company-level negotiation is flexible implementation of the annualized equivalent of the 35-hour week. In Germany, the insurance-sector agreement resembles that of the private banks and has very similar opening clauses. In contrast, in Italy company negotiations are more widespread in insurance than in banking, focusing on issues relating to restructuring as well as on pay linked to performance. This reflects the tradition of company agreements in the sector prior to the 1993 agreement. In the UK, the tendency is for further decentralization, with national company arrangements in the major banks and insurance companies being broken up in favour of business-based bargaining units as financial service activities become more differentiated.
The logic of competitiveness has been inserted into the bargaining agenda in banking and insurance, as in metalworking, in Belgium, Germany and Italy. In addition in Italy, a special tripartite agreement was concluded in 1998 (see below) spurred by the higher cost base of Italian banks as compared to their counterparts elsewhere in Europe.
Managing the consequences of the restructuring of business activities in banks and insurance companies is a theme running through negotiations in all four countries. Flexibility of working time, including Saturday working and new shift arrangements, was on the bargaining agenda at sector level in banking and insurance in Belgium and Germany (where Saturday working in banking is a focus for conflict between employers and unions) and in banking in Italy (company negotiations address the question in insurance). In Italian banking, employers conceded a more significant role for trade unions at both national and company levels in order to manage extensive restructuring and large-scale redundancy. As in metalworking, measures on retirement have been the subject of negotiations in Belgium and Germany. A supplementary pension scheme is under discussion in both sub-sectors in Belgium, while in Germany, there is an innovative agreement on partial pre-retirement in insurance. In the UK, the employment effects of widespread restructuring, employers' need of new patterns of working and job grading, and provision of continuous training have been key issues for company-level bargaining in both banking and insurance.
The Cross-Border Dimension
In metalworking, there is evidence of cross-border comparisons in sectorlevel negotiations in Belgium, Germany and Italy, but the extent, intensity and nature of their use varied considerably. On the trade union side, the main metalworking unions in all four countries are involved in the European Metalworkers Federation (EMF) bargaining coordination initiative (Schulten, 2001) . This initiative has prompted WEM, the employers' organization at European level, to step up its long-established system of information exchange. The impact of these developments on the negotiating practice of both trade unions and employers differs sharply across the countries.
In Belgium, according to both employers and trade unions, crossborder comparisons are regularly deployed in sectoral negotiations. Indeed, the practice is not seen as particularly new, dating back to government intervention in the 1980s aimed at tying inter-sector negotiations to wage cost movements in Belgium's main European trading partners. The obligation for comparison laid down by the 1996 competitiveness law was said by union respondents to have prompted the launch of the 'Doorn' initiative involving the union confederations in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
The Belgian metalworking unions have also been at the forefront of cross-border cooperation under the umbrella of the EMF coordination initiative, together with the Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW) district of IGMetall and their Dutch counterparts (Gollbach and Schulten, 2000) . Union respondents said that the network, created in 1997, makes negotiators better informed when facing employers and more aware of developments in other countries. Both union and employer respondents cited an incident in the 1999 negotiations when data on Germany underpinning the employers' case was questioned by an observer from IG-Metall. The effect was said to be 'psychological': both sides knew that the unions were negotiating in a cross-border context. The benchmarking aspect of the unions' regional bargaining network had indicated that the 2000 metalworking settlement in NRW fell short of the EMF bargaining guideline; some robust exchanges ensued which were also said to have underlined the difficulties in costing qualitative elements of settlements in such benchmarking exercises. On the employer side, the Belgian association has regular contacts with its Dutch (but not German) counterparts: 'it's a very open relationship' (employer respondent).
The deployment of cross-border comparisons in metalworking negotiations in Germany is of a rather different genre. Both employer and trade union respondents reported that general comparisons with other countries are used as 'propaganda' (union officer) in negotiations, but that neither side makes systematic use of such comparisons. Union respondents said that national reference points remain much more important for negotiations than cross-border ones; Germany was more often the object of comparisons by negotiators in other European countries, and especially its neighbours. This was consistent with the observation of a Belgian employer respondent, who remarked that while both parties in Belgium actively engaged in systematic comparative activity, they much less frequently received requests for information from their counterparts in neighbouring countries.
IG-Metall participates in the confederal 'Doorn' process, but more important from its perspective are the bargaining cooperation networks established with countries or regions allied to each of its bargaining districts (Gollbach and Schulten, 2000) . These were described as 'an information exchange initiative in essence' (union officer), among which that between NRW, Belgium and the Netherlands was the most advanced. More embryonic networks involve the Baden-Württemberg region and the Italian metalworking unions, and the Niedersachsen region and the AEEU (now Amicus) in the UK. The latter network has to date focused on reciprocal visits, joint seminars and bilateral information exchange. These cooperation networks were said to demonstrate to employers that the union was negotiating with a European perspective. An employers' association official perceived the unions as exchanging information across borders, but not coordinating bargaining as such. Given employers' systematic exchange of bargaining information through WEM, it was said that there was no need for a specific response to the networks.
In Italy, national reference points still predominate in sectoral negotiations: cross-border references were said to be 'not frequent' (union officer) and usually issue specific. An example was the introduction of a 35-hour week, when employers' organizations and trade unions had undertaken bilateral contacts and exchanges of information with their counterparts in France. Likewise, in the UK, cross-border comparisons were reported not to be an important element in the preparation of major (company-level) claims in the sector, though they are used by both sides in negotiations in the major automotive manufacturers, most usually on non-pay matters, notably working time. Even here, however, national reference points remain more important. Furthermore, both employer and union representatives commented on the logistical difficulty posed by participation in the bargaining information exchange systems of WEM and EMF in the absence of a sectoral UK agreement. Typically, information is supplied on average developments together with what are regarded as 'flagship' agreements. A key challenge for any cross-border bargaining cooperation initiative is how best to mesh sector-based with company systems of collective bargaining.
In financial services, in both banking and insurance (with the notable exception of banking in Italy), cross-border comparisons were markedly less used in negotiations than in metalworking. However, respondents drew attention to the potential consequences of the adoption of common human resource (HR) practices in large international groups across European countries. In part, the bargaining cooperation initiative of UniEuropa's finance section is a response to this development (UNI-Europa, 2000). It is very recent, and a system for the exchange of bargaining information across borders is only now being established. With the exception of banking in Italy, the same observation holds on the employers' side, regular meetings and informal contacts through the European Banking Federation notwithstanding.
In Belgium, beyond the evident impact of the 1996 law on competitiveness on the margin for sector salary negotiations, there appears to be little use of cross-border comparisons in negotiations or cross-border exchange of bargaining information in either sub-sector. In Germany, too, cross-border comparisons were not made 'as a rule' (employer respondent) by either side in either private banking or insurance. When they are, they 'tend to be used in a rhetorical way -for example over Saturday working' (trade union officer). Like their metalworking counterparts, German employers' organizations and trade unions in finance tend to receive requests for information from other European countries rather than seeking such information from others.
In Italy, a special tripartite agreement was signed in banking in early 1998, motivated by the need under EMU to reduce the cost base of banks in line with the EU average (EIRO, 1998) . The same imperative led the employers' association to establish a systematic annual benchmarking of compensation, labour costs, new skills and job classifications in other EU countries, and to undertake comparative projects with its counterparts in other countries. Trade unions in banking accept the logic of cross-border comparison, but question the indicators used and the conclusions drawn. In insurance, the employers' organization is engaged in regular benchmarking of labour costs with other EU countries and pursues bilateral contacts on specific issues, while the unions maintain bilateral contacts on developments in the large corporate groups with their counterparts in France and Belgium in particular. In the UK, there was little reported use of cross-border reference points in the major company-level negotiations in banking and insurance.
In Belgium, union respondents emphasized the future tensions that might arise between the provisions of the sector agreements for banking and insurance and the adoption of common HR policies and practices by large international groups such as Dutch-based ING (which owns BBL) and French-based AXA (which owns Royale Belge). In Germany, too, both employer and union respondents underlined the increasing impact of cross-border comparisons within the large private banks on HR practice. As a result, both sides expected problems in maintaining the consistency across employers that a sector agreement requires. The implication is that decentralization towards the company level can prompt a cross-border European dimension to collective bargaining, but one that is company-rather than sector-based.
Industrial Change and Reconfiguration
In metalworking, a central challenge to existing sectoral agreements in Belgium, Germany and Italy is the burgeoning information and communication technology (ICT) sector. New companies are growing outside existing collective bargaining arrangements, and established metalworking companies covered by the sector agreement are developing their own IT operations. How far ICT companies remain 'agreement-free' varies between the three countries. In Belgium, in so far as their employees are largely white collar, new companies in ICT come under the jurisdiction of the agreement of the auxiliary joint committee, which is a kind of 'catch-all' agreement for employers not covered by a specific (white-collar) sector agreement. Terms and conditions are inferior to those stipulated under the metalworking white-collar agreement, and the scope for flexibility at company level is greater. For the two main blue-collar metalworking unions, the emergence of ICT represents a double challenge: as a new sector, it is not organized, and as white-collar workers, ICT staff do not fall within the two unions' area of recruitment.
In Italy, in 2000 the major telecommunications companies moved from the metalworking agreement to a new ICT-sector agreement established to address a situation where some companies had opted for the commerce-sector agreement (which was regarded by the employers concerned as more favourable). Even so, union respondents claimed that the boundaries between sectors remained fuzzy. Other employers are concluding company agreements rather than applying a sector agreement. Outsourcing of IT activities presented an additional problem, as contractors can apply a less favourable agreement than that covering the original company. Unions are concerned at the possibility of a fragmentation of sector arrangements.
In Germany, by contrast, the new ICT economy is said to be 'essentially an agreement-free space. The big problem is not existing companies leaving the agreement but new companies not coming in' (union officer). New ICT companies remain largely unorganized and the focus of competing aspirations from IG-Metall and Ver.di. 'Insourcing' of IT activities by large companies to newly established subsidiaries was perceived as less of a problem by union respondents, because such operations tend to stay within the scope of the agreement. IG-Metall has made use of supplementary fixed-term agreements in such instances, allowing for greater flexibility of working time.
In the UK, the growing emphasis by established engineering companies on 'systems and solutions' as compared to manufacturing is reflected in a relative movement of employment into R&D and IT activities, where staff typically work in smaller units and are more difficult to organize. As in Germany, the newly established part of the ICT sector remains very much an 'agreement-free' space.
In financial services, the main challenges in Belgium, Germany and Italy derive from three related sources: the transfer of 'back-office' operations into separate subsidiaries; the establishment of new direct-banking subsidiaries; and the growth of call centres (frequently employing new labour). The emergence of 'bancassurance' groups was a matter of concern for current collective bargaining arrangements only for respondents in Italy.
In Belgium, the banks are adopting different approaches to direct banking and call centres. Some create them from existing operations and retain them within the mainstream business, employees remaining under the coverage of the sector agreement. A second group transfers employees into new subsidiaries, leading to trade union pressure for their inclusion under the sector agreement; but employers are resisting, arguing that they require further flexibilities. A third group employs new staff in the new operations, particularly call centres, some being placed under the auxiliary agreement (referred to above). The second and third developments are also evident in the insurance sector. Trade unions are concerned that registration under the auxiliary agreement means inferior terms and conditions and greater scope for flexibility at company level.
In Italy, adjustments have been made to sector agreements to accommodate direct banking and outsourcing. At present, the (national and savings banks) sector agreement has special clauses for the flexibility required for seven-day, 24-hour working, which are then fleshed out in company-level negotiations. On outsourcing, the 1999 sector agreement defined what activities could be outsourced, confirmed that they would remain covered by the banking agreement and made appropriate changes to job classifications. Outsourcing, and particularly call centres, have been the subject of controversy in insurance. As in metalworking, insurance companies are reported to want to apply the more flexible commerce-sector agreement. The 1999 agreement attempted to regulate this, stipulating that call centres would remain covered by the insurancesector agreement, but with lower pay and more working-time flexibility, and a freeze on any further outsourcing. Respondents in both sub-sectors report that the blurring of the boundary between banking and insurance, as a result of the formation of 'bancassurance' companies under recent merger and acquisition activity, raises questions about the application of the respective agreements.
In contrast, the direct banks in Germany (which are mainly separate subsidiaries of the major private banks) are not members of the employers' association or covered by the collective agreement, and have introduced flexibility practices which would not be compatible with the private banks' agreement. For their part, trade unions saw the direct banks, which usually employ new labour, as the biggest challenge to established collective bargaining arrangements in the sector. Their dilemma is whether to try to negotiate company agreements, on inferior terms and with greater flexibilities than the sector agreement, or to leave them in 'agreement-free' space. A second challenge for unions is outsourcing of back-office and IT operations to newly established subsidiaries. In the former case, staff usually transfer across and the sector agreement is applied, but there is pressure to take IT operations out of the sector agreement. A new company agreement for Deutsche Bank's IT subsidiary was concluded during 2001. It was said that this might be a pilot for other companies, and not just banks, with outsourced IT operations and call centres. In insurance, there appears to be much less turbulence in the face of technological developments and business reorganization.
In the UK, IT staff in the main banks are increasingly covered by separate negotiating arrangements from those of banking staff. The restructuring of back-office operations, as they moved to purpose-built sites, was negotiated within the existing national company agreements. Subsequently, there has been a growing trend towards outsourcing such operations, the unions having some success in negotiating collective agreements with these new employers. As in Germany, call centres represent a considerable organizing challenge to the unions.
Summary
The findings point to continuing differences between countries in the ways in which the three challenges to sector-level collective bargaining are addressed, but also to similarities within sectors across countries. There is support for the proposition that diversification within national systems and convergence between them are not incompatible, but mutually reinforcing (Marginson and Sisson, 1998) , resulting in what Katz and Darbishire (2000) describe as 'converging divergences'. This dual process is particularly evident in finance, where the large banks are simultaneously developing HR policies reaching across national borders and differentiating bargaining arrangements and employment practice between different business activities within countries.
Differences between countries (and thereby similarities between the two sectors) are evident in the way in which a logic of competitiveness has been inserted into the sectoral bargaining agenda: explicitly through state imposition in the guise of the 1996 competitiveness law in Belgium; less sharply, although still explicitly, through the tripartite inter-sector agreements in Italy; and only diffusely in Germany. Country differences are also evident in the greater degree to which Belgian and German trade union (and employer) organizations in metalworking are bound in to cross-border cooperation arrangements, as compared to their Italian and British counterparts. Country differences are further evidenced by the response to the challenge of new industries and occupations: significant 'agreement-free' space is emerging in both sectors in Germany, but is hardly evident in Belgium and Italy. Here, new (and some existing) employers are opting for more favourable agreements beyond the two sectors.
Similarities within sectors across countries (and thereby differences within countries) are evident in the greater scope for and incidence of company negotiations in metalworking, as compared with banking and insurance. This reflects, in part, the greater heterogeneity of metalworking; and in part, too, the strength of union or works council organization at company level with the capacity to negotiate, at times autonomously. Similarities are also evident in the sectoral bargaining agenda across countries: flexibility of working time is a particular focus in finance, whereas in metalworking, there is a wider margin for company negotiations over this. Job classifications are a further common item on the agenda of recent banking negotiations. In the face of widespread restructuring and rationalization, recent agreements in both sectors have focused on innovative retirement measures. A final similarity is apparent in the extent to which the cross-border dimension impinges on the negotiating process at sector level: at present, this occurs only in metalworking.
Implications
At the outset we asked how far decentralization can go without undermining the capacity of sector agreements to set and enforce the common rule; whether effective forms of cross-border coordination are developing; and whether a significant disorganized sector may emerge as a result of industrial change. What answers do our findings suggest?
On the first issue, the most extreme possibility is that prevailing sectoral bargaining arrangements disintegrate, giving way to company bargaining (or non-bargaining), as has already happened in the UK. But the only case in our study where sector bargaining is being actively questioned (by employers) is banking in Belgium. Both sides acknowledge that considerable difficulties have arisen from the 1998 working-time agreement, reflecting the disparity among the company-based arrangements that had developed since the previous agreement in 1982; yet the employers' respondent stressed that the period of company-level bargaining over pay and working time had not brought 'anarchy': pay movements had been tightly coordinated through the employers' association. This is consistent with UK evidence from metalworking, where the sector 'lives on' as a focal point for company-level bargaining despite the demise of the national agreement, with detailed comparison of pay and conditions between companies facilitated by the employers' pay surveys (Arrowsmith and Sisson, 1999) . In addition, the large Belgian banks monitor their Dutch counterparts, which have recently opted out of their sector agreement in favour of company-based arrangements.
Otherwise, in both metalworking and finance, employers are pushing for greater scope for company negotiations within the framework of the sector agreement. In Germany, employers' associations in both sectors have adopted reform programmes in recent years. The 1997 'Frankfurt declaration' of Gesamtmetall calls for a reduction in the scope and content of the sector agreement to focus on a few core issues, with minimum rather than standard provisions, a general 'company clause' enabling firms with economic problems to opt out of the agreement for a fixed period, and scope for greater flexibility in working-time arrangements and payments systems. The 1998 statement by AGV Banken similarly called for the sector agreement to focus on a few core topics, including time and money, to set minimum provisions and to increase the room for company manoeuvre through more opening and optional clauses. Similar aspirations were expressed by employer counterparts in metalworking in Belgium and banking in Italy. In metalworking in Italy, employers focus on a reform of the current two-tier system for negotiating pay.
Trade unions vary in their responses to such proposals. In banking in Germany, future differentiation for sub-activities within the sector agreement is considered likely. In Belgium, union respondents feared that company-specific human resource management (HRM) policies in the large banking and insurance groups would destabilize the sector agreements. In Germany, the metal employers' decentralizing agenda was seen as a threat to coherence and common standards for members across the sector. IG-Metall has countered with proposals of its own, including a 'menu' of equivalent options in the sector agreement from which company-level agreements could select (EIRO, 1997). There are disagreements between the Italian unions, including over the relative importance of sector and company levels in negotiations over pay in metalworking. In banking, one of the main unions is seeking negotiations at company level in the large groups emerging as a result of recent mergers and acquisitions, a perspective not shared by other unions.
Overall, where it remains in place, sectoral bargaining appears set to continue: 'reform rather than revolution' is the order of the day. This is because sector agreements in these countries, unlike their (former) counterparts in the UK, constitute not only contracts between the parties, but also more general compulsory codes (Traxler et al., 2001 ). Yet the shift in the balance between the sector and company level may result, as Hassel and Rehder (2001) argue, in a gradual inversion of the established relationship between the two levels. Sector agreements are increasingly adjusting to developments in company negotiations rather than mapping out directions for company negotiators to follow. In the medium term, this is a transformation that could prove corrosive of their basic functions.
Turning to the second question, neither employer nor trade union respondents considered European sectoral agreements mirroring their national counterparts a likely prospect. However, a cross-border dimension to collective bargaining appears to be developing in two directions: 'renationalization' and 'Europeanization' (Martin, 1999) . The first occurs when the disciplines of EMU give rise to concerted national action (either inter-sectoral or sectoral) aimed at bringing wage costs into line with those elsewhere within the single European market. Among the four countries and two sectors, the most explicit instances are the inter-sector agreement in Belgium and the 1998 banking agreement in Italy.
'Europeanization' involves a process of cooperation and coordination across national borders, aligning bargaining outcomes and thereby minimizing scope for a downward spiral in terms and conditions that 'renationalization' potentially exacerbates. Trade union respondents were far more concerned than employers that this contradiction would be resolved in favour of 'renationalization'. It is unions, at both national and European levels, which are actively developing a cross-border dimension to collective bargaining through regional and Europe-wide initiatives promoting information exchange, cross-border benchmarking of settlements and coordination of bargaining agenda and outcomes. Employers' organization activity tends to be more confined, focusing on information exchange and benchmarking of settlements. More active cooperation (for example, between Belgian and Dutch metalworking employers) is in response to trade union cross-border cooperation.
Such union initiatives, as yet, have had no widespread impact on the agenda and outcome of national negotiations in the two sectors; but the extent and intensity of cross-border activity varies significantly between the two. Whereas in finance cross-border cooperation remains largely an aspiration for which plans are being put in place, it has taken concrete shape among unions in metalworking and encompasses a series of crossborder structures. Differences between countries are also evident. 'Arm's length' cross-border bargaining (Marginson and Sisson, 1998 ) is developing across Belgium, the Netherlands and the bordering region (NRW) of Germany, in which the positions of both employers and trade unions are increasingly coordinated even though there is no cross-border bargaining unit. In contrast, metalworking bargaining in Italy (and company-based bargaining in the UK) remains largely unaffected by any cross-border dimension. 'Europeanization' of collective bargaining, it seems, is occurring at different speeds as between both countries and sectors.
Moreover, any 'Europeanization' of collective bargaining may not be driven primarily by sector-level developments. On the employers' side, the promotion of a cross-border dimension is evident above all at the company level (Marginson and Sisson, 1998; Sisson and Marginson, 2000) . In finance, the potentially adverse implications for sector agreements of the implementation of cross-border HRM policies within the large, multinational groups have been noted. It is these same implications which were said to have prompted UNI-Europa to establish a robust system of cross-border benchmarking and information exchange as the first concrete step in its bargaining cooperation initiative. In so far as a cross-border dimension to collective bargaining is driven by such company-level developments, 'Europeanization' could constitute a force tending to unravel, rather than bridge, national sectoral bargaining structures.
Concerning the third question, there are marked differences in the capacity of national sector-based systems to adapt to the emergence of new business activities. In Germany, the emergence of ICT in metalworking and direct banking, together with the separation of back-office operations and call centres from mainstream financial service activities, have led to significant 'agreement-free' space within and on the boundaries of both sectors. If collective bargaining should extend to these new activities, it will probably be company based; none of our respondents envisaged new sectoral arrangements (or extension of the coverage of existing ones) in the foreseeable future. Industrial and business change, therefore, is the motor behind the growth of a significant 'disorganized' element to the collective bargaining system in Germany. In Belgium and Italy, however, similar change is not opening up 'agreement-free' space, but initiating 'bargaining regime competition' as employers in ICT, outsourced and call-centre activities exploit the increased permeability of sector boundaries by applying other, more 'favourable' agreements. If left unchecked, the consequences of such 'bargaining regime competition' might eventually open up the possibility of 'disorganization'. As the provisions of the 'polyglot' sector agreements have progressively less bearing on practice at company level, large companies may begin to question the relevance of remaining within a sector framework, as happened in the UK.
Of methodological significance is the implication of the findings for debates about the relative weight of country-and sector-specific effects on industrial relations arrangements. Reviewing the outcome of a set of comparative sector studies, Hollingsworth and Streeck (1994) conclude that while there are important sector and country differences in broader regimes of economic governance, the latter clearly predominate. The present findings, however, focusing on the more narrow canvas of collective bargaining arrangements, suggest that sector and country effects are of equivalent importance.
Conclusion
The repercussions of ever closer European economic integration on inclusive sector-based multi-employer bargaining are cross-cutting and potentially contradictory. The widespread restructuring that EMU has unleashed has led to growing emphasis on employment and competitiveness, adding to the pressures for further decentralization. At the same time, the progressive creation of a pan-European product market has markedly increased the interdependence between collective bargaining systems, potentially setting them in competition with each other. It is unclear whether the consequent trend towards a cross-border dimension to bargaining will primarily focus on the sector or the company level, and therefore whether it will add to the pressure for further decentralization. Whether a further repercussion of EMU, the 'renationalization' involved in the negotiation of 'social pacts', is likely to fuel competition between national bargaining systems and, therefore, undermine cross-border cooperation, or might actually facilitate collaboration across countries (Dølvik, 2001) , is another open question. Overall, decentralization within and Europeanization of sectoral bargaining arrangements occur simultaneously, but the relationship between the two dynamics is contingent.
European economic integration is not the only source of challenges to sector-based bargaining systems. The emergence of new business activities poses a major threat to the comprehensive regulation which they have secured. In Germany, this has led to the emergence of significant 'agreement-free' space, a pattern more closely resembling developments in the UK, where sectoral bargaining has all but disappeared, than in Belgium or Italy. This raises wider questions about the conditions under which collective bargaining systems successfully adapt to new contingencies. Ferner and Hyman (1998: xxiv) discuss this capacity in terms of the 'flexible rigidity' of different national systems: 'developments in several [western European] countries in the last few years suggest that institutional robustness and successful adaptation depend on a peculiar combination of flexibility and rigidity'. In differing ways, existing arrangements in Belgium and Italy appear to possess a greater capacity for flexibility in continuing to provide the rigidity that the framework of a sectoral agreement entails than is the case in Germany. Further elaboration is needed of what might distinguish successful from unsuccessful combinations of 'flexible rigidity'.
Despite these challenges, sector-based collective bargaining systems do not, in general, seem about to collapse. Pressure for further decentralization looks likely to remain contained within sectoral frameworks, with the UK remaining a distinct case of 'disorganized' decentralization.
